Active Directory (AD)
Microsoft’s directory service for centrally managing users, computers, groups, and resources, and for controlling authentication and access across a network.
I. Overview
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flowchart LR
A["Distributed users\nand resources"] -- "Central management (AD)" --> B["Unified authentication\nand policy enforcement"]
style A fill:#f9f9f9,stroke:#333,stroke-width:3px
style B fill:#e1f5fe,stroke:#01579b,stroke-width:3px
Definition: A directory service developed by Microsoft that centrally manages information about the users, computers, groups, and resources on a network, and that serves as the core infrastructure for controlling authentication and access rights.
Features:
( Centralized Management ) Provides a unified management environment for IT resources such as user accounts, password policies, and computer settings
( Single Sign-On (SSO) ) A single authentication grants access to multiple applications and resources, increasing both convenience and security
( Access Control ) Applies RBAC (Role-Based Access Control)-based security policy through fine-grained, per-resource permission settings
( Authentication Protocol ) Uses a strong Kerberos-based authentication mechanism to guarantee secure communication
II. Mechanism & Components
A. Key Components of AD
graph TD
F["Active Directory Forest"] --> D["Active Directory Domain"]
D --> TR["Trust Relationship\n(Inter-domain / External)"]
D --> DC["Domain Controllers (DCs)\n(maintain replicas of the AD database)"]
D --> DO["Domain Objects\n(User, Computer, Group, OU)"]
DC -->|"LDAP / Kerberos"| DO
- Domain: AD’s basic administrative unit — a set of computers and users that share the same security policy and trust relationships
- Forest: The top-level logical structure of AD, containing one or more domains; each domain maintains its own security boundary
- Tree: A set of domains that share a contiguous DNS namespace
- Domain Controller (DC): Maintains a replica of the AD database (NTDS.DIT) and processes authentication and authorization requests
- Domain Object: Individual pieces of information in the AD database, such as user accounts, computer accounts, groups, and organizational units (OU)
B. Authentication and Authorization Mechanism (Kerberos)
- User authentication: The user obtains a TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) from the KDC (Key Distribution Center) (AS — Authentication Service)
- Service ticket request: Using the TGT, the user requests an ST (Service Ticket) to access a specific service, such as a file server (TGS — Ticket Granting Service)
- Service access: The user presents the ST to the target server to obtain authentication and access privileges (AP — Application Server)
III. Vulnerabilities & Security Measures
A. AD Vulnerabilities and Attack Types
- AD privilege theft: Gaining administrator privileges through techniques such as Kerberoasting, Pass-the-Hash, and Golden Ticket attacks
- Insider threats: Leaked credentials, misuse of privileges, or exploitation of misconfiguration
- Malware infection: Malware that spreads within the AD environment and exfiltrates data
B. Essential Security Hardening Measures
- Least privilege: RBAC-based role separation and fine-grained permission management via a GPO (Group Policy Object) per OU
- Strong authentication: Adopt MFA, limit Kerberos ticket lifetimes, and apply LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution)
- Continuous monitoring: Analyze AD audit logs, integrate with a SIEM, and build detection/response for abnormal access patterns
- Security patching and updates: Keep the DC and related components such as AD CS (Certificate Services) on the latest security updates
Most AD compromises trace back not to a novel exploit but to an over-privileged service account that sat untouched for years — Kerberoasting only pays off because someone gave a service account rights it never needed. Treat privileged-account review as a recurring audit item rather than a one-time hardening step, since AD’s biggest attack surface grows quietly through accumulated privilege, not through newly discovered vulnerabilities.
Last updated 18 Aug 2026, 00:00 UTC.